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1In order to understand the evolution of the Italian political system over the past two
decades, we have to consider the changes undergone by one fundamental institutional
actor, that is, the parliamentary opposition. Its transformation can in fact be used as a
valid indicator of change in the whole political system and it will also help us to reflect
on the possible transformation of the Italian model of democracy. The 20-year path that
has brought Italy to the current political situation, with the emergence of three different
poles of approximately equal strength; the rise of the Five Star Movement; and the
creation of a grand coalition consisting of traditional political opponents will be
reconstructed by re-examining the evolution of the political system from the perspec-
tive of the changing role and functions of the parliamentary opposition, thus contribut-
ing to a better understanding of the (new) political phase initiated by the outcome of
the 2013 election.
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Introduction
This article focuses on one essential aspect of the existence and functioning of all
parliamentary democracies (Dahl 1966), namely, parliamentary opposition. In order to
fulfil the general objective of the contributors to this special issue of understanding the
evolution of the Italian political system over the past two decades, we undoubtedly have
to consider the changes that have taken place in the behaviour of this fundamental
institutional actor. Its transformation can in fact be used as a valid indicator of change
in the whole political system, and it will also help us to reflect on the possible transforma-
tion of the pattern of democracy in the country.
According to the literature, different types of opposition – in terms of composition,
behaviour and expectations – correspond to different patterns of democracy
(Lijphart 1999). In the case of majoritarian democracies, the parliamentary opposition
has no possibility of any consociation or space for negotiation with the government.
Nevertheless, this situation prompts the opposition to present itself as constructive and
alternative so as to compete for power at the next election, as alternation in office is
frequent and guaranteed. In the case of consensual democracies, opposition life is more
advantageous in terms of daily benefits thanks to the consociational dynamics within the
parliament. Opposition, or to be more precise, plural oppositions are not motivated to
present themselves to the electorate as genuine alternatives to the incumbents because
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2alternation in office is rare, if not impossible (Fabbrini 1994; Pasquino 1995). In other
words, as Maeda (2014, 11) has accurately noted, the
Westminster model, in which the opposition is deprived of political influence and the
legislature quickly passes the executive’s proposals, may seem less democratic to the propo-
nents of consensus democracy, but it may have an advantage in enhancing competition
between government and opposition and realizing a regular alternation in ruling parties.
In this context, the history of the Italian political system until 2013 could be split
into two different phases: a consociational era, corresponding to the years of the so-
called First Republic, and a competitive (or alternation) era, mid-1990s onwards. But
after a long period of bipolar competition –, and the parenthesis of the technocratic
government, which can be defined as a period of ‘suspended opposition’ (Marangoni
and Verzichelli 2014) – the 2013 general election saw the unexpected emergence of a
strong third political force, namely the Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle,
M5S), led by the former comedian and blogger Beppe Grillo. This challenged the new
bipolar structure that Italy had acquired in recent years and, because of the absence of a
majority in the Senate, generated a major political crisis that eventually led to the
creation of a grand coalition composed of two former political competitors1: the
centre-left Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD) and the centre-right People of
Freedom (Popolo della Libertà, PDL).2
These political events bring us to the crucial question we intend to address in the
present article: can we speak of the onset of a third major political phase in Italy following
the 2013 election? Our aim is to answer that question by taking the transformation of the
Italian parliamentary opposition since the beginning of the alternation era as our main
indicator. We will start by investigating the opposition’s composition and behaviour since
the mid-1990s in order to ascertain whether it has actually come closer to the Westminster
model – which envisages an opposition that is loyal, alternative, singular and parliamen-
tary (Punnet 1973) –, and then we will try to go further by exploring whether the results of
the 2013 election and the entry of a new strong opposition actor like the M5S in the
parliamentary arena allow us to speak today of the initiation of a new phase.
In relation to the bipolar era, in our opinion it is time to revisit and re-evaluate what
actually changed for both the parliamentary opposition and the whole political system in
that period. So in the second section, we will reconstruct the 20-year path that brought
Italy to the current political situation by highlighting the key stages of the changing
processes that have affected the Italian parliamentary opposition since the mid-1990s, and
by exploring the reasons that explain the inability of this institutional actor, and conse-
quently the entire political system, fully to adhere to the majoritarian model.
As regards the new phase that began in 2013, it is clearly harder to make conclusive
remarks about what has changed and whether or not we should speak of a permanent
(systemic) transformation. But it would certainly be useful to discuss and test some
hypotheses – or to be more precise, expectations – concerning the possible changes
brought about by the above-mentioned election results and the new parliamentarians
(MPs) sitting on the opposition benches. How is the new opposition represented by the
M5S behaving in the parliamentary arena? Does the politically novel image that they
transmit outside Parliament correspond to novelties in the conduct of the opposition in
Parliament? We will try to answer these questions by examining the M5S’ parliamentary
activity and comparing it with that of the other main opposition parties and with the
results of an expert survey administered to a sample of Italian journalists.
3Before turning to the empirical part of this work, in the next section we will outline
our theoretical framework and discuss some preliminary research hypotheses.
Research questions and hypotheses
Parliamentary oppositions are not unitary actors, whether they are officially composed of
one single party as in the case of two-party systems, or of several parties as in the case of
multiparty systems. Oppositions may be unitary objects of analysis, but they are always
formed by numerous actors: these actors are political parties and individual MPs within
them. This is why we believe that the study of parliamentary oppositions should be
divided into at least two different levels of analysis (De Giorgi 2011). The first concerns
their internal characteristics and the relationships among their own members, which is
examined in the first two parts of the next section. The second regards the relationship
with the executive, which we explore in the third part of the next section.
Turning now to our review of the period that was expected to lead the country to the
establishment of a bipolar (majoritarian) system, we will undertake a fresh analysis of the
development of the Italian political system from the perspective of parliamentary opposi-
tion in order to understand what has brought us to the current political situation. What do
we expect from the changes that took place in the 1990s as regards the evolution of the
opposition in Parliament? As far as the first level of analysis is concerned, the degree of
internal cohesion of oppositions usually varies in relation to variations in electoral and
party systems and the strength and composition of executives. So in a two-party system,
the internal cohesion of the opposition, usually composed of a single party, is certainly
stronger than that in a multiparty system. But there are significant differences even
between multiparty systems: our expectation is that there will be a higher level of
organisational cohesion among the opposition members in a multiparty system with
structured bipolar dynamics than in a fragmented multiparty system with unpredictable
electoral alliances. What has happened in the Italian case with the change in the electoral
system since the mid-1990s? Has party fragmentation decreased and the organisational
cohesion of the opposition parties increased? We would expect the answer to that question
to be positive, but as we will see in the next section this has not always been the case.
As far as the second level of analysis is concerned, namely the relationship between
government and opposition and, more specifically, the strategy adopted by opposition
parties in their interaction with the government, the above-mentioned systemic changes
should have encouraged the parliamentary opposition to behave in a more competitive
way. Nonetheless, previous research has demonstrated that favourable stances of opposi-
tion members towards legislation promoted by the government are quite common in both
consensus and majoritarian democracies (Andeweg, De Winter, and Müller 2008;
Christiansen and Damgaard 2008; Cowley and Stuart 2005; Giuliani 2008; Kaiser 2008;
Mújica and Sánchez-Cuenca 2006). A more in-depth analysis of data on voting behaviour
reveals that this tendency towards consensus is mainly influenced by non-systemic factors
such as bills’ initiators and the policy area concerned (Tsebelis 2002; Green-
Pedersen 2007; Jenkins 2010; De Giorgi 2011). So rather than an increase in the level
of conflict between government and opposition, we would expect opposition parties to
behave differently in relation to the substantive characteristics of government legislative
proposals.
As we know, even if all of these dynamics are confirmed, they came to a standstill in
2013. In fact, the election led to the rise of a strong third pole, represented by the M5S,
which seriously challenged the bipolar structure that Italy had achieved in the years
4previously. It is therefore necessary to explore how this new opposition actor has behaved
in Parliament and, more importantly, to discuss the possible launch of a completely new
phase in the evolution of the Italian political system. From this perspective, it should be
noted that Italy has followed a path similar to that of many other European democracies in
recent years: a significant transformation in the party context and the fall of many
governing parties due to the onset of the economic crisis, which led to ‘the growth of
abstention, increasing parliamentary fragmentation and the emergence of new political
forces, notably those expressing anti-party, extreme right-wing or even racist positions’
(Bosco and Verney 2012, 150). In the case of Italy, it was anti-party sentiment in
particular that brought about the downfall of both the centre–right and the centre–left
coalitions and the rise of the M5S (Moury and De Giorgi 2014). As pointed out by
Mair (2011), it seems generally that ‘governing capacity and vocation’ have become
characteristic of a more or less restricted group of parties belonging to the mainstream of
the party system – parties able to offer voters a choice of government. On the other hand,
the capacity of ‘representation’, that is, the expression of the people’s voice, has become
the characteristic of a different group of parties. These parties constitute the ‘new
opposition’: they rarely govern, they usually make frequent use of populist rhetoric and,
to employ Sartori’s terminology, they represent a kind of ‘semi-responsible’, if not
completely ‘irresponsible’, opposition (1966). Assuming that the M5S might represent
such a ‘new opposition’ in Italy, how are they behaving now that they have entered the
parliamentary arena? Can we speak of two different types of opposition in Parliament: that
of the ‘old’ parties on one hand and that of the M5S on the other? And in what respect is
the M5S different from the other opposition parties? First, we expect the voting behaviour
of M5S to be more cohesive and conflictual than that of the ‘traditional’ parties. Second,
we also envisage that the strategy adopted in Parliament will be different. In particular, we
assume that the M5S will present themselves as a radical alternative not only to the
government in office but also to the other opposition parties. As a result, we expect they
will be more active in the input sphere (that is, in the sphere of legislative proposals and
amending activity) and in scrutiny of the government (through tabling questions and
interpellations and introducing motions) than the other opposition parties.
In the third section of this work we try to test these hypotheses by examining the
opposition’s parliamentary activity in the XVII legislature – comparing the behaviour and
strategy of the M5S with that of the other minority parties – and also by identifying the
media’s opinion of the ‘new’ opposition carried out by the M5S.
The opposition’s evolution in the bipolar era
The steps forward
As we know, one of the most significant features of the Italian political system in the years
of the so-called First Republic was the absence of alternation.3 Only a series of political
and institutional events in the late 1980s and early 1990s – the crisis of communism, the
Tangentopoli scandal and the reform of the electoral system among others – gave rise to
the changes that marked the beginning of the so-called Second Republic, the end of the
exclusion of the anti-system parties4 from the government arena and, for the first time in
the history of the Republic, the realistic expectation of alternation in government
(Verzichelli and Cotta 2000).
What is particularly interesting for us is whether these political and institutional
developments have affected the role and functions of the parliamentary opposition in
5any way. In our opinion, there are three political–electoral moments that marked a definite
turning point for the parliamentary opposition by acting as a stimulus for the evolution of
this actor in a majoritarian direction, and they correspond to three election years: 1996,
2001 and 2008.
The first general election of the ‘new era’ took place in 1994. On that occasion, a
new electoral system – a mixed system, largely based on single-member constituencies –
was employed and, for the first time, both the centre-right and the centre-left parties
formed strategic pre-electoral alliances. It was the centre-right coalition formed by Forza
Italia (FI), the National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale, AN) and the Northern League
(Lega Nord, LN) and led by Silvio Berlusconi that won the election, beating the centre-
left group. But the heterogeneity of this coalition meant that the first Berlusconi
government lasted only a few months and a caretaker government, headed by
Lamberto Dini, held office from 1995 until the following election. Despite the undis-
puted importance of the 1994 general election, it was the 1996 election that marked
major change for the parliamentary opposition and initiated a new phase in the evolution
of the Italian political system as a whole. In fact, this was the first time political parties
formed only two major pre-electoral coalitions at the polls, following a purely bipolar
logic and effectively excluding any third force from the competition. The 1996 election
led to the victory of the centre–left coalition, called the Olive-tree Alliance, and the
formation of the first Prodi government. But more importantly, it was the first time that
two different groupings sat in Parliament and that, despite their heterogeneity, they
could be clearly identified by the electorate as a majority and an opposition. This made
the subsequent election, held in 2001, a real ‘watershed’ (Pasquino 2002), for both the
parliamentary opposition and the political system, and this for two reasons: there was a
bipolar contest between an incumbent government and a genuinely alternative opposi-
tion, and therefore alternation in government became possible. With the establishment of
the second Berlusconi government, this possibility was realised and, once elected, the
centre–right coalition became the first majority government in the history of the country
to emerge from a bipolar electoral contest based on the choice of a specific coalition and
the clear indication of a prime ministerial candidate. The Westminster model had never
been as close.
In 2006, the incumbent government led by Silvio Berlusconi was defeated and
replaced by the centre–left coalition led again by Romano Prodi; however, the new
electoral law introduced at the end of 20055 meant that the victory was so narrow that
the government was forced to resign and new elections were called less than 2 years later.
The 2008 election represents the third crucial step towards the consolidation of a
majoritarian system in Italy: the institutional framework was actually much less fragmen-
ted than in the past. As we can see from Table 1, there were only six parliamentary groups
(PGs) in both chambers (including the mixed group). This allowed the new government
led by Silvio Berlusconi to control an unprecedentedly ‘simple’ majority of only two
parties, the PDL and the LN. The simplification of the party system was evident even
when we look at the composition of the parliamentary opposition, which included only
three political forces: two from the centre-left, the PD and Italy of Values (Italia dei Valori,
IdV), and one from the centre-right, the Union of the Centre (Unione di Centro, UDC).6 In
addition, the formation of the first shadow cabinet in the history of the country, led by the
PD General Secretary and defeated prime ministerial candidate, Walter Veltroni, seemed
to add to the parliamentary opposition’s growing recognition as a fully fledged institu-
tional actor. But the Italian shadow cabinet survived for only a few months being
disbanded with few regrets early in 2009 following the resignation of Walter Veltroni.
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7The problems of internal cohesion were not resolved, whether we look at the opposition as
an individual actor or consider the individual parties within it.
The backward steps
In addition to the fall of the first (and last) shadow cabinet in the history of the Italian
Republic, the Italian opposition’s path towards the assumption of a fully recognised and
institutionalised role within Parliament has recently encountered two major hurdles: the
first, which was thought to be only temporary, occurred during the caretaker government
led by Mario Monti; the second and certainly more significant came with the 2013
election, which initiated a completely new phase for the parliamentary opposition and
the entire political system. As we have already noted, the last election saw the emergence
of three (rather than two) main poles of almost equal size, the consequent distortion of
majoritarian bipolarism and the serious risk of institutional paralysis. The political crisis
that followed was finally overcome only through a compromise that led to the formation
of a grand coalition formed by the political parties that had alternated in government until
a few months earlier. The opposition to the new government led by PD leader Enrico Letta
continued to be the new entry M5S – along with the LN and the PD’s former electoral
ally, the Left, Ecology and Freedom (Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà, SEL), together with
some other minor forces. We will examine in greater depth the consequences for the
parliamentary opposition of this new phase in the last section.
As noted above, the establishment of the technocratic government had already repre-
sented a breaking point in the evolution of the parliamentary opposition in a majoritarian
direction, but this was not thought to be a halt but only a pause until new elections were
held. Nevertheless, during the period of the caretaker government, the opposition’s role
was essentially ‘frozen’: the government led by Monti was in fact supported by a large
variegated majority, which included the PD, the PDL, the UDC, the new centre-right
group, the Future and Freedom for Italy (Futuro e Libertà per l’Italia, FLI),7 and a number
of other minor forces. Only the LN, having supported the Berlusconi government for the
previous three years, and IdV were officially in opposition. The LN had repeatedly
stressed that the decision to stay in opposition was due not only to its disagreement
with the policies of the government, but also to the desire to guarantee the minimum
requirements of a democratic system, namely the presence of at least one opposition party
in Parliament.
This assertion was only partly true: opposition is actually considered the crowning
institution of a fully institutionalised political society and the hallmark of those variously
called democratic, liberal, parliamentary, constitutional, pluralistic (Ionescu and De
Madariaga 1968); but the mere presence of an opposition in Parliament is not enough.
It is the quality of the opposition – together with the ability of the government – that is the
crucial variable with respect to the efficient and effective functioning of contemporary
democracies (Pasquino 1990). For example, we could take the case of the Swiss
Confederation. Despite the absence of a formal opposition in the Assembly and the
presence of all the major parties in the Federal Council (i.e. the government),
Switzerland is fully recognised as a democratic system. On the other hand, during the
so-called First Republic in Italy, it was impossible for the major opposition party, the
Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI), truly to compete for power by
proposing itself as a real alternative to the government in office. This situation raised
serious doubts about the quality of Italian democracy in that period. In fact, although the
presence of an opposition in Parliament was largely guaranteed, the two main forces
8concerned – the PCI on the one hand and the MSI on the other – could not actually act as
a ‘government in waiting’. In contrast, the possibility of alternation was secured in all the
other Western European democracies, even though it did not necessarily happen after any
given election. This was the case, for instance, in the UK with the successive election
victories of the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher. So it is not the mere presence of
an opposition in Parliament that ensures the existence and the effective functioning of a
democracy. The essential requirements are the opposition’s capacity to check and criticise
the government’s action and the possibility of presenting itself to the electorate as a real
alternative to the government in office.
To conclude, what can be said of the Italian parliamentary opposition and the way it
performed its role in the alternation era? The creation of two (relatively) stable opposing
poles and the presence of bipolar competition have proved to be necessary but not
sufficient conditions for the complete realisation of a majoritarian system. In fact, the
Italian opposition continued to lack some crucial attributes in terms of Punnet’s definition
(1973): the persistent party fragmentation within each coalition and the absence of
political will in both political camps have certainly undermined the organisational cohe-
sion and coordinated parliamentary action required to enable the opposition to evolve into
a genuine institutional actor. As a result, the image of the opposition transmitted outside
Parliament has been confusing and not always clearly identifiable: certainly far from the
model to which the country had seemed to aspire.
Relations with the government
In this part, we will explore government–opposition dynamics using the conduct of the
opposition parties in the law-making process as an indicator, and verify whether they
usually adopt a more or less consensual profile and whether there has been any change in
this behaviour in the last 20 years.
According to previous research, the extent of the opposition’s support in Parliament
has not decreased since the mid-1990s despite the confrontational style that emerged with
the new electoral law. In the 1996–2006 period bills were approved with favourable votes
that averaged 90.3% of the votes of those present (Giuliani 2008). It seems that none of
the systemic changes that occurred in the political system in the last 20 years have
affected the distribution of support between government and opposition. More recent
analyses have not only confirmed this finding but also demonstrated that the opposition’s
level of support depends on non-systemic factors and, in particular, on the subject of the
legislative proposal8 and the effectiveness of the government’s action in parliament. In
fact, it has been shown that the (voting) behaviour of the opposition party groups is
significantly affected by the content and nature of government bills (De Giorgi and
Marangoni 2013). In particular, the more programmatic commitments there are in a bill,
the greater the number of dissenting votes becomes (Marangoni 2010). To this end,
Table 2 shows averages of the index of support for government legislation by the
parliamentary opposition in the 1996–2013 period, that is from the XIII to the XVII
legislature (not including the Monti government).
The index of support is calculated, on the basis of the final vote in the Chamber of
Deputies, as the number of non-dissenting votes (i.e. ayes and abstentions) cast by
opposition MPs in relation to a government bill as a percentage of the total number of
non-dissenting votes cast in relation to the same bill.9 In the last column of Table 2, we
can observe the average index for the total number of bills approved in Parliament for
each government under consideration. The most relevant finding relates to the nature of
9legislative proposals. Looking at the first two columns, we can observe that the program-
matic origin of government bills significantly affects the level of support of opposition
MPs, and this is true for all of the governments under examination with the sole exception
of the Letta government.10 So, as we can see, while the general index of support during
the two governments led by Silvio Berlusconi is 0.27, this index drops to 0.14 and 0.17
when we consider only those bills related to the executive’s programmatic commitments.
The same phenomenon can be observed during the two governments led by Romano
Prodi: the level of support of the parliamentary opposition drops from 0.27 and 0.26
respectively to 0.21 and 0.13 when programmatic issues are at stake. The same is true for
the Renzi government.11 These data show that although the level of support of the
opposition has not decreased as we expected, since the beginning of the alternation era
it has been strongly affected by specific factors such as the content and the nature of the
bills under discussion. Seen from a different perspective, it has been conditioned by the
(increasing) capacity of governments to implement their programmatic promises and
priorities: certainly one crucial result of the systemic changes that have taken place in
Italy since the mid-1990s.
Of course, the consequences for the parliamentary opposition and its relationship with
the government of the new political phase initiated by the 2013 election, are still hard to
predict. Nevertheless, in the next section we will attempt to examine the first phase of the
XVII legislature with a view to verifying whether a change has actually occurred both in
the behaviour of the opposition, and in government–opposition interaction.
The XVII legislature: the emergence of a new opposition?
As already noted, the great success of the M5S at the general election of 2013 represents
one of the most relevant political novelties in Italy in the last 20 years. Once in
Parliament, M5S MPs stressed their extraneousness to the ‘old’ party dynamics and
their unavailability for any post-electoral alliance aimed at overcoming the political
paralysis that overtook Parliament in the initial weeks following the election. The M5S
wanted to present itself as a brand new political movement, born precisely to make that
paralysis happen and radically to change Italian politics. Therefore, they introduced
themselves in Parliament as a new alternative opposition, with a firm resolve to get into
government in the near future.
But what we want to know is whether the M5S has kept its pledges in the parliamen-
tary arena and whether the party’s PG has actually behaved in a substantially different
way to that of the other opposition parties. In particular, as we said in the first section of
Table 2. Index of opposition support for government bills* (1996–2011).
Programmatic Non programmatic All
Prodi I 0.21 0.27 0.25
D’Alema I-II 0.25 0.33 0.32
Amato II 0.34 0.34 0.34
Berlusconi II-III 0.14 0.27 0.23
Prodi II 0.13 0.26 0.22
Berlusconi IV 0.17 0.27 0.23
Letta 0.17 0.15 0.16
Renzi 0.09 0.14 0.13
Note: *Not including the ratification of international treaties.
10
this article, first we would like to verify whether the M5S PG is more cohesive and
adversarial in terms of voting behaviour than the other minority groups. Second, we will
test whether their parliamentary action is more oriented to the input sphere (legislative
proposals and amending activity) and scrutiny of the government (through questions,
interpellations and the tabling of motions), given their aim of presenting themselves as a
genuine alternative with respect to the old party system.
To this end, we followed two different but interrelated paths: we investigated the
behaviour of the M5S through the analysis of parliamentary data – that is legislative and
non-legislative activity – and then we turned to a very relevant actor in this context,
namely the media. An expert survey was conducted among journalists responsible for
reporting on the Italian parliament. This allowed us to see how the media – which are to
some extent responsible for the image of parliamentary parties that is perceived outside
the parliamentary arena – consider the new opposition activity of the M5S. The survey
was conducted over about four weeks, beginning in early November 2013. The 28
journalists12 who participated in this survey were from a total of 23 different news
organisations and distributed quite uniformly across the print media, television and
news agencies.
Let us start with the parliamentary data and the first level of our analysis, namely that
of organisational cohesion. We employed an adjusted version of one of the most popular
indices of cohesion in the literature, that is, the Agreement Index (AI) by Hix, Noury, and
Roland (2005). This index takes into consideration three different voting options (Yes, No,
Abstention) and reaches its highest point (1) when all of the MPs (in this case, belonging
to the same PG) vote in the same way and its lowest point (0) when the same MPs are
distributed equally among the three voting options. But the AI does not take into account
the attendance rate, which we believe to be quite relevant. In fact, if more than 90% of the
PG members are absent and the few who are present vote differently, the index would
show a strongly divided group although this would not correspond to reality. For this
reason, we calculated two different indices: one weighted by the attendance rate and
another considering absences as votes against.13
The results are shown in Table 3. As we can see from the first two columns, the level
of cohesion of the M5S is higher than that of the other opposition groups in both cases. In
fact, the result remains unchanged even when absences are considered as votes against, as
in the second column. In that case, the index increases for all the party groups,14 but the
M5S remains most cohesive (from 0.72 to 0.91). This confirms what we were expecting,
that is, that the unity of the M5S is markedly higher than that of the other opposition PGs.
This is because their line of action, as is widely known, is decided outside of Parliament
by their supporters (or by the leader Beppe Grillo, as many observers think) and then it is
Table 3. Index of cohesion of main opposition party groups and support in the XVII legislature.
Level of cohesion with
attendance rate
Level of cohesion with absences
counted as dissenting votes Level of support
M5S 0.72 0.91 0.27
LN 0.60 0.85 0.30
SEL 0.66 0.78 0.34
FI 0.36 0.67 0.25
Notes: The Forza Italia PG was (re)constituted on 19 November 2013 and was consequently taken into
consideration in this analysis from that time onwards.
Votes for the approval of parliamentary bills and international treaties are excluded from the calculations.
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strictly followed by the MPs.15 Party – or more precisely group – unity is a crucial, and
proudly adhered to, characteristic of the M5S in parliament. According to Pinto and
Pedrazzani (2015), the features of the M5S PG make MPs less likely to challenge the
party line in legislative voting in comparison with other parliamentary parties. This is
probably due to a distribution of resources between the leader and MPs that is skewed
towards the former.
The second variable we aim to test is the level of M5S support for government
legislative proposals. We examined the voting behaviour of the main opposition groups
in the final stage of the law-making process. We created an index of consensus (IC) for
each opposition party group that is equal to the relationship between the sum of favour-
able votes and abstentions and all the possible voting options, including absences. We
included absences in the denominator because, given Parliament’s standing orders, they
can be considered as a particular kind of conflictual behaviour. The opposition party
members can, in fact, choose absenteeism for either symbolic or strategic reasons, in order
to distance themselves from a given legislative proposal or to try to prevent the House
from reaching the legal quorum.
The results of our analysis are summarised in the last column of Table 3. As we can
see, the behaviour of the M5S is quite conflictual but not very different from that of the
other opposition parties: FI has an index score (0.25) that is even lower than that of the
Five Star group (0.27). Their IC is certainly low, but this is also true for all the other
minority groups: the LN (0.3) and SEL (0.34) seem only slightly less adversarial than the
M5S and FI. So the conflictual behaviour usually attributed to the M5S is confirmed by
looking at its actual conduct in the law-making process but it is not an exception if we
compare it with the other opposition parties.
The response of journalists on this subject is in line with our findings. We asked them
to indicate if, in their opinion, the M5S in opposition has a competitive attitude – aimed at
demonstrating to the electorate that it could be a concrete alternative to the government in
office –, a cooperative attitude – aimed at seeking and obtaining compromise in order to
influence the politics of the government –, or an adversarial attitude – aimed at demon-
strating dissent from government initiatives. The result is unequivocal. Out of all the
interviewees, 85.7% think that the conduct of the M5S in Parliament is adversarial and not
inclined in any way to cooperate with the government. So our results so far indicate that
the ‘new’ opposition tends, as expected, to oppose rather than compromise with, the
government in office, but is not particularly distant from the ‘traditional’ opposition
parties.
Finally, let us explore whether the activity of M5S MPs is more oriented to the input
sphere of the legislative cycle and to scrutiny of the government. First, we looked at the
number of legislative proposals introduced by the M5S. The number of bills initiated by
Five Star MPs as first signatories is not higher than that of the other opposition groups; on
the contrary, more legislative proposals have been introduced by the LN. In concrete
terms, we have 343 bills presented by the M5S, 437 by the LN, 146 by SEL and 161 by
FI.16 As far as amendments are concerned, the findings show that the M5S seems to have
been particularly active in this field: 4466 amendments as compared to 2178 and 1970
presented by the LN and SEL, respectively. But if we divide these numbers by the number
of MPs belonging to each PG, the average number of amendments presented by both LN
and SEL MPs is higher than it is for M5S MPs.
We then asked the media representatives to state what they believed to be M5S’ main
strategy when it comes to convincing the electorate that it is a concrete alternative to the
government in office. We proposed three possible options: presentation of alternative
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proposals to those of the government; presentation of amendments; and the assumption in
public of critical positions vis-à-vis government initiatives. According to 75% of the
journalists interviewed, the M5S tends to assume a critical position towards the govern-
ment, a response that is completely in line with the journalists’ previous view that the
M5S’ attitude is clearly adversarial, something that also confirms that the M5S does not
consider legislative activity to be as effective as other parliamentary activities.
This is also shown by our further analysis of non-legislative activity – that is, the
tabling of questions, interpellations and motions, which are the main actions parliamen-
tary oppositions can take to perform their scrutiny function – in the current legislature. We
explored how much use the opposition parties have made of these instruments. The results
are summarised in Table 4. As we can see, the M5S has made greater use of these
instruments than the other opposition groups: specifically, M5S MPs have presented more
than twice as many questions (3211) as SEL (1226) and more than three times those of
LN (971)17; nearly the same can be said with regards to interpellations – 185 for the M5S,
only 42 for LN and 141 for SEL – and motions – 224 presented by M5S MPs, 101 by LN
MPs and 110 by SEL. It is evident that scrutiny is considered by the M5S to be much
more important and effective than legislative activity.18 As all the Five Star MPs are total
neophytes in Parliament, non-legislative activity might be strategically more important
than participating in decision-making because of the complexity of the issues debated and
the ‘costs’ of being sufficiently informed to participate effectively in legislative activity.
This issue also arose from the responses to the last question from the expert survey.
We asked the journalists whether they thought that there was a concrete difference
between the opposition activity of the M5S and that of the other minority groups in
Parliament. According to a large majority of the journalists interviewed (92.9%), there is
definitely a crucial difference. When asked to specify this difference, the result proved
very interesting because three main ideas emerged regarding the difference between the
M5S and the other opposition parties. One relates precisely to the (lack of) experience of
the MPs rather than to their attitudes. A significant number of our respondents felt that the
Five Star MPs are simply not competent enough to engage in parliamentary activities,
unlike the other opposition members. The idea is that they might potentially have much
greater influence but that this is frustrated by their lack of skills. The second response is
related to their ‘distinctiveness’. A large proportion of our interviewees thought that the
main purpose of the activity of M5S MPs was precisely to be perceived as radically
‘alternative’ – to be perceived as the bearers of a totally alternative conception of
government, as being willing to accept confrontation but unwilling to compromise. For
this reason, they reject any collaboration with the other political forces other than
occasional cooperation on single issues. Finally, another significant group of our respon-
dents think that the M5S tries to offer an alternative to the current government, as other
Table 4. Non-legislative activity of the main opposition groups in the XVII legislature.
Questions Interpellations Motions
M5S 3211 185 224
LN 971 42 101
SEL 1226 141 110
FI 633 44 43
Note: The Forza Italia PG was (re)constituted on 19 November 2013 and was consequently taken
into consideration in this analysis from that time onwards.
13
opposition PGs have tried (and still try) to do. But they seem to propose an alternative to
the entire system, while the others more ‘traditionally’ propose alternative policies.
Anyhow, it is the conflictual aspect of the opposition rather than the alternative that
prevailed in the past and seems to prevail today even more strongly with the M5S. So
despite very high expectations, not much seems to have changed.
To conclude, even with the entry of the M5S in Parliament, the opposition’s attitude in
the XVII legislature has remained mainly adversarial, and not only in legislative terms.
What has changed is rather the object of conflict: until the XVI legislature it was mainly
the controversial figure of Silvio Berlusconi (De Giorgi 2011); today the whole party
system seems to be the object of the ‘new’ opposition’s action.
Conclusion
The aim of this article has been to reconstruct the 20-year path that has brought Italy to the
current political situation by revisiting the changes that have taken place in the political
system from the perspective of the evolution of the parliamentary opposition. As we said
at the beginning, the history of the Italian political system until 2013 can be split into two
different phases that could be called the consociational and competitive (or alternation)
eras. The rise of a strong third political force like the M5S at the 2013 election, and the
political crisis it generated, undoubtedly challenged the bipolar structure Italy had recently
acquired, which makes us wonder whether we can speak of the onset of a third major
political phase. Our aim was to answer that question using as our main indicator the
transformation of the Italian parliamentary opposition since the beginning of the alterna-
tion era.
Italy’s consociational practices were well-known phenomena in the years of the so-
called First Republic. The transformation of the Italian political system – notably the
bipolarisation of party competition – started in the mid-1990s and we expected this to
have an impact on parliamentary dynamics and the relationship between majority and
opposition in particular. To ascertain this transformation, we identified the crucial steps
taken towards a new model of opposition: the change in the party system; the creation of
two opposing coalitions and the consequent rise of unprecedented bipolar competition; the
accomplishment of the first alternation in government. Then, we explored the political
events that led to this movement coming to a standstill: the establishment of a technocratic
government in 2011; the emergence of a new strong third pole at the 2013 election and the
political crisis generated by that election result. Finally, we investigated what had hap-
pened since the M5S entered Parliament. In particular, we tried to verify whether this
resulted in a radical change in the behaviour of the opposition and whether a new
conception of opposition has emerged both within and outside Parliament.
The M5S undoubtedly represents the most significant novelty in the Italian party
system in recent years and, at the same time, it embodies what is defined all over Europe
as the ‘new opposition’: a new political subject, founded precisely to oppose the older
mainstream parties, which are perceived as inadequate and principally responsible for the
dramatic economic situation that many countries have had to face since 2008. But when
we look at its behaviour in Parliament, not much seems to have changed as far as the
opposition’s conduct is concerned. What has prevailed in the last two decades and still
seems to prevail today is the conflictual rather than the alternative aspect of parliamentary
opposition. While the ‘traditional’ opposition failed to achieve a new institutional role due
to a lack of formal rules and political will on the part of the actors involved, the ‘new’
opposition has not yet completely exploited its window of opportunity in order to present
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itself as a complete alternative to both the government and the traditional opposition
parties. The strategy adopted in Parliament by the Five Star MPs is to some extent
different from that of the other opposition parties, but even in the media’s opinion it is
not enough to make them appear more alternative rather than simply adversarial.
There can be no doubt that the 2013 election has initiated a new phase in Italian
politics. It is hard to predict exactly where this will lead, but there will probably be no
going back. The new opposition embodied by the M5S certainly represents a step away
from the path to bipolarisation the country had followed since the mid-1990s. However,
this does not necessarily mean that a truly alternative and competitive parliamentary
opposition will fail to appear. As has been shown in the past, the main reason for the
failure of a new and more functional form of democracy to emerge is the lack of political
will rather than of formal rules. And the challenge represented by a new political actor
such as the M5S could serve the purpose of generating this will and activating a process
of change on the part of all the opposition parties collectively.
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Notes
1. Together with some other minor parliamentary party groups.
2. This until November 2013, when the PDL split into two separate groups: on the one hand, the
re-established Forza Italia (FI) that was led by Silvio Berlusconi and which opposed the new
Renzi government, and on the other hand, the New Centre Right (Nuovo Centro Destra, NCD)
led by Angelino Alfano, the current Minister of the Interior.
3. The main opposition parties (and above all the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista
Italiano, PCI)) performed their role only in part by controlling and criticising the executive’s
activities and attempting to influence its policies – exploiting the governments’ intrinsic
weaknesses – and they were never able to present a realistic alternative to the incumbents
(Di Palma 1977).
4. Particularly the PCI on the left, and the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (Movimento
Sociale Italiano, MSI) on the right.
5. For a full explanation of the electoral laws approved in Italy since the early 1990s, see
Chiaramonte’s contribution to this special issue.
6. The UDC had until 2006 actually been a member of the centre–right coalition led by Silvio
Berlusconi.
7. FLI was founded by the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Gianfranco Fini, who was
expelled from the PDL, together with a number of PDL deputies and senators who decided to
leave the party with him.
8. The majority of the bills approved deal with narrow issues that are usually quite consensual; it
is consequently crucial to control, among others, the content variable when investigating the
voting behaviour of the opposition parties.
9. Votes for the ratification of international treaties are excluded from the count.
10. This result can be explained by taking account of the fact that the ‘programme’ of the Letta
government, especially at the beginning, was still bound by the situation of crisis (more than
that of Renzi). Legislative initiatives addressing the crisis situation may have encountered
fewer obstacles. Furthermore, for the XVII legislature (that is, for the Letta and Renzi
governments) we should bear in mind that we are speaking of a small number of laws.
11. In addition, index scores are of course sensitive to the size of the opposition, which varies
from one government to another. So it more useful for a comparison of the programmatic and
non-programmatic initiatives of the same government than it is for a comparison of different
governments.
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12. An expert survey on the role and image of the Italian parliamentary opposition in the
alternation era was conducted in 2011 (see De Giorgi 2012). Of the 55 journalists who had
been interviewed on that occasion, 28 agreed to respond again to the same set of questions,
this time concerning the M5S in opposition.
13. We do not consider MPs who are not present because they are ‘on a mission’ as being absent.
14. We decided not to include the centre-right Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia) in our analysis
because, given the small number of MPs belonging to the group, the comparison might have
been biased. In addition, data about FI are of course related to a shorter period, because the
group was (re)founded only in November 2013 when they decided to move from the ranks of
the governing majority to the opposition.
15. For this purpose, the Movement established an Internet-based platform to give citizens the
possibility of regularly shaping political decisions. In addition, the heart of the M5S PG is the
‘assembly’, composed of all Five Star deputies and senators and it is responsible for taking
decisions on legislative voting (including how MPs should vote on the floor), bill proposals
and allocation of the places assigned to it in parliamentary committees (Pinto and Pedrazzani
forthcoming 2015).
16. Data updated to early October 2014.
17. In this count, FI is not exactly comparable with the other opposition groups, since the group
was formed 9 months later than the others.
18. However, if we divide these numbers by the number of MPs in each group, we see that the
difference between the M5S and the other opposition parties is again not that big and it is
again ‘in favour’ of LN and SEL MPs.
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